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RECIPROCAL AND RETALIATORY LEGISLATION
IN THE AMERICAN STATES
By JOSEPH R. STARR*
E ARLY in this century, a distinguished Canadian scholar voiced
a criticism of federal government that has become classic."
He pointed out that federalism is ill-suited to the conditions of
modern industrialized society, and predicted that it will eventually
be displaced by some form of national and centralized government.
He wrote at a time when federalism was widely favored as the
solution of many governmental ills. A half century earlier, the
United States had been the only important example of federalism.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, federalism
was adopted by Switzerland, the German Empire, Canada, and
Australia. Its seeming success in all these places suggested its
extension elsewhere, and even led to such grandiose schemes as
that of British imperial federation.
In the twentieth century, federalism has fared by no means
so well. It was rejected in the formation of the Union of South
Africa. It made an appearance in the post-war constitutions of
Europe only in a questionable form in two of the democratic con-
stitutions-those of Germany and Austria-and in the strange
devices of the Soviet Union. Germany has lately abandoned fed-
eralism altogether, 2 and few remnants of it are left in the new
Austrian constitution.8 British imperial federation was dealt a
last blow by the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee in 1926. In
the older federal states, the centralizing tendency has gone on
apace, while in highly centralized states the demand is not for fed-
eralism, but merely for decentralization, whether it be called devo-
lution or regionalism, or the "new federalism" of political pluralism.
A more recent contribution to the literature of federal govern-
ment, like the earlier criticism mentioned, recognizes the difficulties
which arise in a federal state because of industrial and commercial
integration.4 The authors of this later contribution, however, take
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
'Leacock, The Limitations of Federal Government, (1908) 5 Proc. Amer.
Pol. Sci. Ass'n 37-52.
2Pollock and Heneman, The Hitler Decrees (1st ed., Ann Arbor 1934)
Nos. 16, 17; (2nd ed., Ann Arbor, 1934) No. 3.
sZurcher, Austria's Corporative Constitution, (1934) 28 Amer. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 664-670.4Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 685-758.
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a more matter-of-fact point of view in noticing the invention in
the United States of legal and customary methods for the adjust-
ment of problems common to two or more states. Two such
methods were, of course, provided in our constitution, namely, the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in interstate disputes and the
interstate compacts clause. These have been supplemented by no
less than six extra-constitutional means for solving interstate
problems, as follows: the work of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; reciprocal legislation; the
conscious practice of courts to base decisions in certain fields on
grounds of needed harmony between jurisdictions; conferences
of state governors and other state officials, serving as opportunities
for the exchange of views on state policies; federal legislation
complementing state action, as in liquor and game legislation and
grants-in-aid; and the regulation of interstate preserves by the
practical fusion of state administrative agencies, as in the case
of the Palisades Interstate Park (New York and New Jersey). 5
The purpose of the present article is to consider the second of
these extra-constitutional methods, namely, reciprocal legislation,
together with the closely related subject of retaliatory legislation,
in sufficient detail to enable a judgment to be formed upon their
importance as factors in the partial adjustment of federalism to
modern economic conditions.
Both reciprocal and retaliatory legislation are branches of
interstate comity, which, by analogy with international practice,
may be defined as an observance of interstate privileges beyond
the requirements of the federal constitution.8 Reciprocal legisla-
tion is a means of dealing with matters of common concern to
two or more states. It requires mutual or correlative action on
the part of the legislatures of the different jurisdictions. One
state enacts legislation to be operative on behalf of the citizens or
officials of another state upon condition that the other state enacts
like or corresponding legislation. Reciprocal legislation is thus
conditional or contingent legislation, since it depends for its full
effect upon an event beyond the control of the enacting legislature,
that is, the passage of a similar act by a foreign legislature. Re-
ciprocal legislation should be distinguished from, first, uniform
legislation, and, second, an interstate compact. It is true that
5Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 685, 688-691.
OFor a general discussion of comity, see Barry, Comity, (1926) 12 Va.
Law Rev. 353-375.
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uniformity, or substantial uniformity, must exist between the
complementary statutes of two states in order to have a reciprocal
relationship. However, uniform statutes ordinarily take effect
immediately. They are not usually couched in terms that post-
pone the effect of the statute until another state, or other states,
adopt the same uniform statute. Reciprocal legislation may
always be distinguished from the larger body of uniform legisla-
tion by the fact that a reciprocal statute must contain a clause
stating the necessity for similar action on the part of the other
state or states.
An interstate compact is, to all intents and purposes, a treaty
negotiated and ratified by two or more states. The passage of
reciprocal legislation is an integral part of the process of conclud-
ing a compact. The participating states must pass uniform
legislation authorizing the governor or other officials to negotiate
the compact, and, unless ratification is clearly implied in the
original legislation, other legislation is needed in order to declare
the compact in effect. Reciprocal legislation ordinarily requires
no negotiation between state officials, although it may in many
cases, as discussed later, be supplemented by reciprocal agree-
ments negotiated by administrative officials. Reciprocal legislation,
moreover, requires no act of ratification on the part of the legis-
lature. A reciprocal statute, so to speak, carries its own ratification
in its own terms. It is worded so that it automatically comes into
effect when the stated conditions come into existence. This, of
course, often requires a decision by administrative officials as to
whether the statutory conditions actually have been fulfilled, and
this may in practice be a question of considerable difficulty. Re-
ciprocal legislation is further distinguished from an interstate
compact in that the former does not require the consent of the
Congress of the United States.
The distinction between reciprocal legislation and interstate
compacts as to subject-matter is one that is impossible to draw
in any precise way, in the absence of judicial decisions delimiting
the respective fields of each. So far as can be determined, no
superior court has ever ruled on what matters of common concern
to the states can be dealt with in reciprocal legislation, and thus
escape the necessity of receiving the consent of Congress. 7 No piece
7See the dissenting opinion in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v.
Klaus, (1911) 145 App. Div. 798, 130 N. Y. S. 713. In this case a New
York reciprocal statute enacted in 1902, providing a means to compel
New York residents to attend as witnesses in the criminal courts of other
states, was upheld. However, in the dissenting opinion written by Judge
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of reciprocal legislation ever has been declared unconstitutional
because it had not received the consent of Congress. There is no
evidence that any reciprocal legislation ever was submitted to
Congress for its consent, or that Congress ever gave its consent
to any. Yet the interstate compacts clause of the constitution
makes it clear that some agreements among the states require the
consent of Congress. It would be ridiculous to suppose that the
consent of Congress is needed for all sorts of agreements among
the states upon matters of common concern." If this interpreta-
tion were placed upon the interstate compacts clause, Congress
would find that entirely too much of its time would be occupied
in the consideration of matters submitted by the states. The long
experience in interstate relations has resulted in common consent
on the rule that interstate agreements on routine matters, in the
nature of business arrangements, do not need the consent of
Congress. It will be obvious that practically all, if not all, the
examples of reciprocal legislation discussed in this article are in
fact business arrangements among the states. They do not in any
way add to the political power of the states that participate in
them, nor do they undermine the power of Congress as the federal
legislature. It is thus clear that the settled practice allowing the
enactment of reciprocal legislation without the consent of Congress
is a logical and convenient arrangement, and entirely consistent
with the federal constitution.
In its commonest form, reciprocal legislation is a device where-
by one state, by legislative action, undertakes to secure for its
citizens an advantage or an immunity by granting that advantage
or immunity to the citizens of any other state on condition that the
other state make a similar grant. When such a mutual interchange
Laughlin it was argued, inter alia, that the reciprocal statute was in fact
an interstate compact, and therefore invalid because it had not received
the consent of Congress. See further, for comment on this decision, Gordon
Dean, The Interstate Compact-A Device for Crime Repression, (1934)
1 Law and Contemp. Prob. 460-471, and the same writer's address on
Interstate Compacts for Crime Control, published in Proceedings of the
Attorney General's Conference on Crime, Held December 10-13, 1934,
Washington, D. C., 64-69, and (1935) 21 A.B.A. J. 89-91; also Report of
the Committee on Securing Compulsory Attendance of Nonresident Wit-
nesses in Civil and Criminal Cases, (1922) Handbook of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 358-361.8See Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution
Mean by "Agreements and Compacts"? (1936) 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 453-464.
It is argued that by "agreements and compacts" the framers of the con-
stitution meant only "(1) settlements of boundary lines with attending ces-
sion or exchange of strips of-land, (2) regulation of matters connected with
boundaries as for instance regulation of jurisdiction of offenses committed
on boundary waters, of fisheries or of navigation."
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of favors has been arranged, the participating states are said to
have reached the condition of reciprocity. This meaning of
reciprocity should be distinguished from its more common meaning
with reference to tariff legislation. Retaliatory legislation, on the
other hand, is a legislative threat of the imposition of penalties
upon the citizens of other states which impose penalties upon the
citizens of the enacting state.
One of the most important fields in which reciprocal legislation
has developed is the licensing of trades and professions. Licenses
to practice trades and professions commonly are issued by the
states through administrative boards upon examination of appli-
cants who satisfactorily meet certain preliminary requirements,
the chief of which is usually the presentation of a certificate of
graduation from a reputable trade or professional school. The
essence of reciprocity in this matter is for one state to provide
for the recognition within its boundaries of the licenses issued by
any other state, provided that the other state concerned main-
tains equal standards in the particular trade or profession and
extends a like privilege to persons licensed in the first state.
Reciprocity can ordinarily exist only when the employment is
licensed by the state rather than by local authorities, and when
the state undertakes to pass upon the fitness of applicants by
administering examinations. The interstate privilege involved is,
therefore, the exemption from the required examination when the
applicant already has been licensed in another state. Any arrange-
ment which results in exemption from examinations is commonly
spoken of as reciprocity; but a distinction should be drawn between
reciprocity, speaking properly, which involves the granting of
exemptions on both sides, and the grant of such exemption as a
matter of comity without any demand for a similar grant on the
other side.
One way to view the interstate aspects of the licensing of
trades and professions is to examine the arrangements which exist
among a group of states with respect to all licensed employments.
Five northwestern states-Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Montana-have been selected for this purpose.
A comparison of the statutes of these states reveals that twenty-
two different employments 9 are licensed under the following gen-
gThe statutes are cited here together for convenience of reference. The
complete list of employments appears in the Minnesota citations. The sub-ject of teachers' certification was omittted from this survey.
Wisconsin: Stat. 1935: architect, sec. 101.31; attorney, sec. 256.28 (1),(2), (3), (6) : barber, secs. 158.06-.11; basic sciences, secs. 147.01-.08;
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eral conditions: (1) all practitioners are required to be licensed;
(2) licenses are issued by state, and not local, authorities: and
(3) the state passes upon the fitness of applicants by administer-
ing an examination. Minnesota is the only one of the five states
in which all twenty-two employments are licensed. 0 Wisconsin"i
licenses twenty of them, and Montana, North Dakota,12 and South
beauty operator, sec. 159.08; chiropodist, sec. 154.02-.03; chiropractor, sec.
147.23; civil engineer, sec. 101.31; dentist, secs. 152.03-.05; embalmer, secs.
156-04, 156-08; masseur, sec. 146.185; midwife, secs. 150.02-.03; nurse, secs.
149.04-.06; optometrist, sees. 153.03-.05 (2) ; osteopath, secs. 147.15-.17;
pharmacist, 151.02 (2), (6) ; physician and surgeon, sees. 147.15-.17;
plumber, secs. 145.06-.09; public accountant, secs. 135.02-.05; veterinarian,
sees. 95.51-.63.
Minnesota: Mason's 1927 Stat. (unless indicated as Supp. 1936):
architect, Supp. 1936, sec. 5697-9; attorney, sec. 5685; barber, 6upp. 1936,
secs. 5846-5, 6, 7, 11, 12; basic sciences, sees. 5705-6, 5705-7, 5705-9; beauty
operator, sec. 5846-39, Supp. 1936, sec. 5846-34; chiropodist, Supp. 1936,
secs. 5772, 5773, 5782; chiropractor, sec. 5729; civil engineer, Supp. 1936,
sec. 5697-9; dentist, Supp. 1936, sec. 5762-4; electrician, secs. 5873, 5874,
5876; embalmer, sees. 5818, 5819; masseur, Supp. 1936, secs. 5784-16, 17, 18;
midwife, sec. 5722; nurse, sec. 5751, Supp. 1936, sec. 5747; optometrist,
Supp. 1936, sec. 5790; osteopath, sec. 5737; pharmacist, sec. 5802, Supp.
1936, sec. 5800; physician and surgeon, secs. 5707, 5709, 5710; plumber,
Supp. 1936, secs. 5887-19 to 29; public accountant, sec. 5701, Supp. 1936,
sec. 5700; stationary engineer, sec. 5487; veterinarian, sec. 5848.
North Dakota: architect, Supp. 1925, sees. 2999a18, 2999a20 to 25; at-
torney, Supp. 1925, sec. 790, Laws 1931, ch. 90; barber, Laws 1927, ch. 101,
secs. 6, 11, and sec. 5 as amended, Laws 1931, ch. 99; beauty operator,
Laws 1927, ch. 157, secs. 12, 14; chiropodist, Laws 1929, ch. 95, secs. 6,
9, 11; chiropractor, Supp. 1925, sec. 523a3, Laws 1933, ch. 82; dentist, Laws
1933, ch. 104, sec. 4; electrician, Laws 1927, ch. 139, secs. 2, 4; embalmer,
Laws 1931, ch. 141, sec. 1; nurse, Supp. 1925, sec. 506a9; optometrist, Supp.
1925, sec. 528; osteopath, Laws 1933, ch. 202, secs. 4, 5; pharmacist, Comp.
Laws 1913, sec. 486, Laws 1935, ch. 232, sec. 1; physician and surgeon,
Comp. Laws 1913, secs. 461, 464, 465, Supp. 1925, sec. 465; public accountant,
Supp. 1925, secs. 557a8, 557a9; veterinarian, Comp. Laws 1913, secs. 2713,
2717.
South Dakota: Comp. Laws 1929 (unless otherwise indicated): archi-
tect, secs. 8194-G, H, K; attorney, secs. 5284, 5285; barber, Laws 1931,
ch. 209, secs. 5-10; beauty operator, Laws 1931, ch. 213, sec. 1; chiropodist,
Laws 1931, ch. 212; chiropractor, secs. 7730-D, E, L; civil engineer, secs.
8194-G, H, K; dentist, sec. 7751; embalmer, Laws 1931, ch. 216, secs. 2, 3;
nurse, sees. 7772, 7773; optometrist, sec. 7759, Laws 1935, ch. 166, sec. 2;
osteopath, sec. 7722; pharmacist, sec. 7738, Laws 1931, ch. 205, sec. 1;
physician and surgeon, secs. 7705, 7706, 7708; public accountant, Laws 1931,
ch. 208, secs. 3-6; veterinarian, sec. 8077-B.
Montana, Rev. Code 1935: architect, sec. 3231; attorney, sees. 8936,
8937, 8940; barber, sec. 3228.21; beauty operator, secs. 3228.1-.8; chiropodist,
sec. 3154.3; chiropractor, sees. 3142, 3143, 3152; dentist, secs. 3115.5, 3115.6;
embalmer, sec. 2456; nurse, secs. 3210, 3211; optometrist, sec. 3159; osteo-
path, secs. 3127, 3135; pharmacist, sees., 3176, 3183; physician and surgeon,
sec. 3118; public accountant, secs. 3241.1-.2; stationary engineer, secs. 2719,
2720; veterinarian, secs. 3220, 3224.
'
0But an examination for the license as architect or civil engineer is
required only when the board is in doubt as to the applicant's fitness.
"3But an examination for a license as midwife is required only when
the applicant is not a graduate of an approved school giving a one-year
course.
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Dakota"3 sixteen each. Persons licensed in one of these states
can, of course, move into a nonlicensing state without any need
for reciprocity.
All the twenty-two employments are licensed in at least two
of the five states considered. It will thus appear that there is a
total of ninety instances in which statutory arrangements might
be made for the interstate recognition of licenses. In twenty-six
instances, no such arrangements are made; in thirty instances,
licenses are recognized on a reciprocal basis; and in thirty-four
instances, licenses are recognized on a basis of comity without
any reciprocal requirement. 14  It thus appears that these north-
western states make genuine efforts to provide for freedom of
movement across state lines by persons engaged in licensed employ-
ments. Two methods of making such arrangements, reciprocity
and comity, are available, and one is used about as frequently as
the other. It is further significant that the instances in which no
arrangements are made for the interstate recognition of licenses
occur most frequently with respect to employments for which the
period of training is not long, nor the other qualifications especially
difficult to satisfy, such as the trades of barber, beauty operator,
electrician, and stationary engineer.
Interstate recognition of licenses is provided for by all five
states in only six employments, namely, attorney, dentist, nurse,
optometrist, physician and surgeon, and public accountant; and
by four states in six employments, namely, architect, chiropodist,
chiropractor, embalmer, osteopath, and pharmacist. It would
seem that practitioners of these employments, having once qual-
ified for a state license, might move with relative freedom from
one of these neighboring states to another with a fine disregard for
the internal political boundaries accompanying our federal form
of government. This may not be so, because the formula provid-
ing for the interstate recognition of licenses almost invariably
stipulates that the other state concerned in the exchange must
maintain equal standards for entry into the employment." The
'
2But architects are not required to be licensed.
13 But no examination or special training is required for a license as
veterinarian.
'Both Minnesota and Wisconsin recognize the licenses of physicians
and surgeons by comity, but in each case the statute contains a retaliatory
provision. The Wisconsin law also applies to osteopaths. The Minnesota
law formerly was both reciprocal and retaliatory, but the reciprocal feature
has been repealed.
IrSixty-two statutory provisions for the interstate recognition of licenses
divide as follows: (1) use of words "equal standards," "equivalent require-
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freedom of movement of licensees therefore depends not only
upon the statutory provisions for comity and reciprocity, but also
upon uniformity in the statutes fixing the standards for licensed
trades and professions. There is a high degree of uniformity in
the statutes relating to the licensing of trades and professions,
and national trade and professional groups exert a constant pres-
sure for more uniformity. At the same time, there are many
variations in the standards fixed by different states. Some of
these are, of course, inconsequential, and are often disregarded
by the licensing boards having jurisdiction. Others are sub-
stantial, and operate as a bar to the interstate recognition of
licenses. As examples of substantial variations, it may be noted
that some states permit the training for such employments as
attorney, barber, embalmer, optometrist, and veterinarian to be
gained through apprenticeship, while others require graduation
from an approved school ;16 the minimum duration of the pro-
fessional instruction,', or the period of preliminary experience
required for some employments,18 is subject to variation; and
there is considerable difference of opinion among the states as to
whether the pre-professional education to be required for cer-
tain employments should be fixed at completion of the eighth grade,
the high school, or the junior college.19 When such considerations
ments," or "same educational qualifications," forty-eight instances; (2) use
of words "substantially equal," three instances; (3) no specification of this
kind, eleven instances.
16Graduation from approved trade or professional school not required:
attorney, North Dakota, South Dakota; barber, Minnesota; embalmer, Wis-
consin. Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana; optometrist, Minnesota;
pharmacist, Montana; veterinarian, Wisconsin, South Dakota.
llLength of professional course; chiropractor-three years, Wisconsin,
North Dakota, South Dakota; four years, Minnesota, Montana; nurse-
two years, Wisconsin; three years, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Montana; osteopath-three years, South Dakota, Montana; four years, Wis-
consin, Minnesota, North Dakota; veterinarian--eighteen months, Minne-
sota; three years, Montana.
18Length of experience required: architect-none, Montana; three years,
North Dakota; five years, Wisconsin, Minnesota; six years, South Dakota;
civil engineer-six years, Minnesota, South Dakota; seven years, Wiscon-
sin; pharmacist-none, Montana; one year, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South
Dakota; two years, Minnesota; public accountant-none, Wisconsin, Mon-
tana; one year, South Dakota; three years, Minnesota, North Dakota;
stationary engineer-three years, Montana; five years, Minnesota.
19Length of pre-professional education required: chiropractor -high
school, Wisconsin, Minnesota, South Dakota, Montana; two years college,
North Dakota; dentist-not specified, Minnesota, South Dakota, Montana;
high school, Wisconsin; one year college, North Dakota; nurse - not
specified, South Dakota; eighth-grade, Minnesota, North Dakota; one
year high school, Wisconsin; two years high school, Montana; physician
and surgeon-not specified, Minnesota, South Dakota, Montana; high school,
Wisconsin; two years college, North Dakota.
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as these are taken into account, it appears that the interstate
recognition of licenses is in fact existent among all the five states
of the northwest region in not a single employment, although
among four states it is existent with respect to six employments,
namely, chiropodist, dentist, nurse, pharmacist, physician and sur-
geon, and public accountant.
Another way to gain a conception of the extent of reciprocity
in the licensing of trades and professions is to examine the statutes
of all the states with reference to a selected trade and a selected
profession. Such a survey has been made for the trade of bar-
bering and the profession of dentistry.
Forty-one states require barbers to be licensed.2 0  Until re-
cently, only a few states licensed barbers, and the requirements
were relatively simple.2 1  The older statutes required applicants
to be nineteen years of age, of good moral character, and free from
infectious, contagious, and blood diseases, and to pass an exami-
nation to test skill in the use, care, and disinfection of tools and an
elementary knowledge of skin diseases. More recently, many
states have passed statutes which fix higher standards for barbers'
licenses. An eighth-grade education frequently is required,22 and
formal instruction in the trade must be obtained either as an
apprentice or in an approved school of barbering. Moreover, the
schools are required to give instruction in, and the examinations test
knowledge of, a wide range of subjects designed to put barbering
on a more scientific basis. The most important difference in the
standards fixed by the states is as to whether graduation from a
school of barbering is required or optional. On this basis, the
forty-one states licensing barbers fall into two classes. Seventeen
will not admit applicants to examination until they have com-
pleted the course of an approved school, while twenty-four permit
the training to be gained in any way desired.23 Even if the statutes
2OThe states which do not license barbers are: Arkansas, Maine, New
Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia.21Ten years ago, only fourteen states licensed barbers. See U. S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin, No. 28 (May, 1925).22Eighth-grade education required: Alabama, Arizona, California, Con-
necticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon,
South Dakota, and West Virginia; tenth-grade: Wisconsin; seventh-grade:
Michigan; sixth-grade: Minnesota. Required to read and write English:
Colorado, Mississippi, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
23CIass I (graduation from barber school required) : Arizona, Laws
1935, ch. 51, secs. 6, 7, 8, 11, 12; Florida, Laws 1931, ch. 14650 (No. 12),
secs. 5, 6, 7, 11; Indiana Stat. (Baldwin) 1934, ch. 18, secs. 4058 to 4061;
Iowa, Code 1935, secs. 2585-b13, 14; Kentucky, Stat. (Baldwin) 1936, secs.
165 b-5, 6, 7, 11; Louisiana, Gen. Stat. 1932, secs. 9371, 9372, 9373, 9377;
Montana, Rev. Code 1935, sec. 3228.21; Nebraska, Comp. Stat. 1929, secs.
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contained reciprocal clauses, there could be no recognition of
licenses by states in the former class when issued by states in the
latter class. This would be true because of the usual provision
that equal standards must be maintained. As a matter of fact,
not one of the statutes of the first class contains a reciprocal clause.
On the contrary, they specifically provide that barbers from other
states must take the usual examination.24  The interstate recogni-
tion of barbers' licenses is also rare among the states having the
less strict requirements. The statutes of only four states make
provision for such recognition-three by comity and one by reci-
procity.
25
All the states license dentists. 2  The requirements are sub-
71-2004, 6, 9, 12; Nevada, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 767 and secs. 764, 765,
as amended, Laws 1931, ch. 207, secs. 3, 4; North Carolina, Code 1935,
secs. 5003 (c), (e), (1); North Dakota, Laws 1927, ch. 101, secs. 6, 11,
and sec. 5, as amended, Laws 1931, ch. 99; Ohio, Gen. Code 1931, secs.
1081-13, and secs. 1081-9, 12, 19, 20, as amended, Laws 1931, pp. 314-319;
Oregon, Code Supp. 1935, 68-405, 406, 407, 411; South Dakota, Laws 1931,
ch. 209, sees. 5-10; Texas, Complete Stat. Supp. 1934, 734a7, 8, 9, 13; Utah,
Rev. Stat. 1933, 79-4-2 to 6, 13; Wisconsin, Stat. 1935, secs. 158.06-.11.
Class II (graduation from barber school not required) ; Alabama, Laws,
1931, No. 508, secs. 4, 5; ex. sess. 1936, No. 113, sec. 1; California, Gen.
Laws (Deering) 1931, Supp. (Deering) 1933, secs. 6, 12, Stat. and Amend-
ments to the Codes 1935, ch. 297, sec. 11; Colorado, Comp. Laws Supp. 1932,
secs. 4746, 4747; Connecticut, Gen. Stat. Supp. 1935, sec. 1194c; Delaware,
Laws 1935, ch. 103, sec. 5; Georgia, Code 1933, sec. 84-409; Idaho, Code
1932, secs. 53-605, 606, 611; Illinois, Laws 1931, p. 200 seq., secs. 3 to 6, 8,
10; Kansas, Laws 1933, ch. 224, sec. 2; Maryland, Code Supp. (Flack)
1935, art. 43, sec. 275, 276, 277; Massachusetts, Gen. Laws 1932, ch. 112,
sec. 87H; Michigan, Comp. Laws Supp. (Mason) 1935, secs. 8700-1, 8700-2;
Minnesota, Stat. Supp. (Mason) 1936, secs. 5846-5, 6, 7, 11, 12; Mississippi,
Laws 1932, ch. 118, secs. 6, 7, 11; Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1929, sec. 13528; New
Jersey, Laws 1933, ch. 175, secs. 3, 5, 9; New Mexico, Laws 1935, ch.
111, secs. 4, 5, 6; Oklahoma, Stat. Supp. 1936, secs. 4336, 4340; Pennsyl-
vania, Stat. (Purdon) 1936, tit. 35, secs. 658, 659; Rhode Island, Laws
January, 1935, ch. 2222, sec. 1; Tennessee, Code 1932, sees. 7122, 7123, 7127;
Washington, Rev. Stat. (Remington) 1932, secs. 8277-3 to 6, 10; West
Virginia, Laws 2nd ex. sess. 1933, ch. 82, secs. 5, 6, 7; Wyoming, Rev.
Stat. 1931, secs. 11-105, 11-115.2 4The usual provision is that an applicant from another state who pre-
sents either (1) the license of a state maintaining equal standards, or (2)
sworn evidence of five years' practice in another state, will be issued a
journeyman's license, entitling him to practice until the next regular exam-
ination. See the statutes of Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska,
North Dakota, and South Dakota. Some states require a shorter term of
experience; three years: Kentucky; two years: Indiana, Ohio, Oregon, and
Texas.2 5Georgia, Idaho, Pennsylvania, and Washington (reciprocal).
26Alabama, Code 1928, secs. 328, 329, 354; Arizona, Laws 1935, ch. 24,
secs. 14, 18, 19; Arkansas, Laws 1921, No. 289, secs. 3, 9, 20; California,
Gen. Laws (Deering) 1931 and Supp. 1933, Act 2048, sec. 7; Colorado,
Laws 1935, ch. 103, sec. 6; Connecticut, Gen. Stat. Supp. 1935, secs. 1142,
1146c; Delaware, Code 1915, as amended, Laws 1933, ch. 48, secs. 892B,
C; Florida, Laws Gen. 1931, ch. 14708 (No. 70), secs. 9, 10; Georgia,
Code 1933, ch. 84-7, secs. 84-709, 84-710; Idaho, Code 1932, secs. 53-1306,
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stantially uniform, consisting in the main of graduation from a
reputable dental college27 and examination by a board of dental
examiners. Eight states-Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, Rhode Island-make no provision
for the recognition of licenses issued by other states, although it
appears that all these will admit to examination the graduates of
dental colleges in other states. Thirteen states-Alabama, Dela-
ware, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri.
Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Washington, and West Vir-
ginia-make only a limited provision for such recognition, since
they authorize their boards of dental examiners to require dentists
from other states to take a practical or clinical examination. This
07, 18, 20; Illinois, Rev. Stat. (Cahill) 1929, ch. 91, par. 82, and Laws
1933, p. 708, sec. 4; Indiana, Stat. (Baldwin) 1934, ch. 29, sec. 5588; Iowa
Code 1935, sees. 2438, 2567; Kansas, Rev. Stat. Supp. 1930, sec. 65-1404;
Kentucky, Stat. (Baldwin) 1936, sees. 2636-3; Louisiana, Gen. Stat. 1932;
sees. 9519, 9522; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930, ch. 21, sees. 28, 29, 31; Maryland,
Code Supp. (Flack) 1935, art. 32, sec. 4; Massachusetts, Gen. Laws 1932,
ch. 112, sees. 45, 46, 48; Michigan, Comp. Laws Supp. (Mason) 1933, sec.
6780-6; Minnesota, Stat. Supp. (Mason) 1936, sec. 5762-4; Mississippi,
Code 1930, sees. 4303, 4304, 4306; Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1929, sees. 13560,
13570; Montana, Rev. Code 1935, sees. 3115.5, 3115.6; Nebraska, Comp.
Stat. 1929, sees. 71-202, 71-503, 71-1203, and 71-501, 71-1210, as amended,
Laws 1933, ch. 122, sec. 2; Nevada, Comp. Laws 1929, sees. 2336, 2338,
2348; New Hampshire, Pub. Laws 1926, ch. 205, sees. 7, 8, 21; New Jersey,
Comp. Laws Supp. 1924, sec. 56-22; New Mexico, Comp. Stat. 1929, sees.
37-104, 37-105; New York, Con. Laws (Cahill) 1930, sees. 1306, 1308,
as amended, Laws 1933, ch. 609; North Carolina, Code 1931, sees. 6631,
6643; North Dakota, Laws 1933, ch. 104, sec. 4; Ohio, Gen. Code 1931,
sees. 1321, 1321-1, 1322, 1324; Oklahoma, Stat. Supp. 1936, sees. 4371x.
4371zl; Oregon, Code Supp. 1936, sec. 69-1004; Pennsylvania, Stat.(Purdon) 1936, tit. 63, sec. 122; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws 1923, ch. 169, sec.
4, as amended, Laws 1929-30, ch. 1588; South Carolina, Code 1932, sees.
5199, 5206; South Dakota, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 7751; Tennessee, Laws
1935, ch. 126, sees. 6, 24; Texas, Complete Laws 1928, arts. 4544, 4545,
4545a, as amended, Laws 1935, ch. 244, sees. 2, 3; Utah, Rev. Stat. 1933.
sees. 79-6-1, 79-6-2; Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, sees. 7501, 7502, 7505;
Virginia Code 1930, sec. 1646; Washington, Laws 1935, ch. 112, sees. 4, 5,
13; West Virginia Code 1931, sees. 30-4-6, 30-4-8; Wisconsin, Stat. 1935,
152.03-.05(2) ; Wyoming, Rev. Stat. 1931, sec. 34-110, and sec. 34-104, as
amended, Laws 1935, ch. 61, sec. 1.
27A1 the states have a general requirement that applicants for the
dental license shall be graduates of an approved dental college. New Jersey
will admit to the examination a dentist who is not a graduate but who is
licensed in a foreign country; New York, a nongraduate who has practiced
in another state for twenty years, in which case only the practical examina-
tion is required. The length of the dental course is specified by only
eight states; four years: Arkansas, Idaho, Michigan, Washington; three
years: Illinois, Massachusetts, Wisconsin; one or two years: Missouri.
Nineteen states have enacted requirements as to the pre-dental training;
high-school education: Connecticut, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia,
Wisconsin; one or two years' college: Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Massa-
chusetts; preliminary education prescribed by board: New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania.
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is made mandatory upon the boards of dental examiners in six
states-Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Washington, and
West Virginia-while it is left to the discretion of the boards
in the other seven states.
Certain conditions frequently are attached to the recognition
of dentists' licenses, but none of these is inconsistent with the
principles of interstate comity. The commonest condition is that
the other state concerned must maintain equal standards for entry
into the profession, 2 but this has little significance because of the
similarity of the requirements in all the states. Many states also
require that the applicant must have been in the legal and
ethical practice of dentistry for a period of five years in another
state.29 An applicant also is commonly required to present a duly
attested copy of the out-of-state license, and a statement by the
board of dental examiners of his former state certifying his good
moral character and professional ability.30
The forty states which recognize the dental licenses of other
states divide as follows according to the method of granting such
recognition: thirty-two states make the grant on a reciprocal basis;
six states make the grant by comity without demanding the same
favor on the other side ;31 one state has a comity provision, while
at the same time authorizing its board to negotiate reciprocal
agreements ;2 and one state has a comity provision with a retalia-
tory clause to protect its own licensees.33
It may be concluded that there is substantial freedom of move-
ment for dentists of five years' experience among nearly all the
states. Thirteen states, to be sure, require a clinical examination;
but this is not a serious invasion of interstate comity, as it is the
written or theoretical examination which men in the profession
wish to avoid in later life. Many of the disabilities affecting mem-
bers of this profession and arising from our federal form of
government have been removed, and reciprocal legislation is the
means chiefly responsible for this desirable state of affairs.
2SThis condition is expressed in the statutes of twenty-nine states.
29Twenty-eight states require five years' practice in the former state
of residence; two states require three years' practice.
3OTwenty-two states require the certificate of recommendation. Seven
of these require that such certificate must be presented within six months
of the date of issue.
S1The states which recognize dental licenses by comity are: Connecticut,
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, New York, and Tennessee.
32 Comity with authorization to negotiate reciprocal agreements:
Georgia.
33Nebraska, Comp. Stat. 1929, sec. 71-503, is a general retaliatory pro-
vision applicable to all trades and professions licensed by the state.
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A digest of the rules relating to the licensing of attorneys re-
veals that all the states have made arrangements for the recogni-
tion of licenses issued by other states.34 Only six states, however,
have passed reciprocal legislation on this subject,35 all the others
providing for the recognition of attorneys' licenses by comity.
The principal condition attached to such recognition is that the
applicant must have been in the practice of law for a period of one
to ten years in another state, three or five years' practice being the
common requirement.
Reciprocity also exists with respect to civil engineers among
most of the states requiring them to be licensed. 36 This condition
was brought about by the formulation of national standards for
the profession by a council of the state boards of engineering
examiners, and by a multilateral agreement entered into by most
of the boards. Engineers are required to have ten years' experi-
ence in responsible positions before they may apply for the recogni-
tion of their licenses in other states.
A few states have reciprocal statutes relating to the licensing of
nonresident auctioneers. 37 In this case, reciprocity has no relation
to a qualifying examination in order to practice a trade, because
no such examinations are administered, but relates to the right
to conduct sales and possibly also the exemption from certain fees.
The statute may generally prohibit nonresident auctioneers from
conducting sales, but make an exception in favor of residents of
states which provide for the admission of residents of the enact-
ing state. The statute may also have a retaliatory clause, providing
for the imposition of the same fees and disabilities required by a
neighboring state.
One state, Utah, has enacted a general reciprocal provision
permitting the recognition of licenses for all trades and professions
issued by other states; and two states, Iowa and Nebraska, have
enacted general retaliatory provisions applicable to all trades and
professions, authorizing the imposition of the same penalties and
disabilities experienced by their licensees in other states.38 The
34Rules for Admission to the Bar in the Several States and Territories
of the United States, in Force March 1, 1934, 21st ed.3GGeorgia, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, and Oregon.
30(1929)Annual Report of the Iowa State Board of Engineering
Examiners 5-8.
87Iowa, Code 1935, sec. 9864; Minnesota, Stat. Supp. (Mason) 1934
and 1936, sec. 7322; North Dakota, Laws 1927, ch. 89; South Dakota,
Laws 1931, ch. 85; Vermont, Laws 1935, No. 37.
38Iowa, Code 1935, secs. 2483, 2489; Nebraska, Comp. Stat. 1929, sec.
71-503; Utah, Rev. Stat. 1933, sec. 79-1-19.
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Iowa code also authorizes the negotiation of reciprocal agreements
with respect to a number of employments affecting public health.30
According to this plan, the department of health is required to
negotiate such agreements with any state which is certified by the
board of examiners concerned as having requirements substantially
equivalent to those maintained in Iowa. A considerable number
of such agreements apparently have been negotiated, and Iowa
is in reciprocal relations with many states respecting several em-
ployments. 40
It is an interesting question whether reciprocal legislation
relating to the licensing of trades and professions should be self-
executing, or should come into effect only when supplemented by
administrative agreements negotiated by the respective boards of
examiners. The comprehensive plan of Iowa is not the only
example of the statutory authorization of such agreements, 41 and
boards have been known to enter into such agreements without
specific authorization.42  The great number of agreements neces-
sary to cover a score or more of employments among forty-eight
states undoubtedly places grave disadvantages upon this plan, a
parallel being offered by the bilateral negotiation of treaties in the
international field. If administrative agreements are necessary at
all, it would seem that multilateral ones arranged by the national
organizations of the professions concerned would be a more prac-
ticable procedure.
This question of reciprocal agreements is closely connected
with the problem of the interchange of information concerning
the requirements set up by different states for entry into trades or
39Iowa, Code 1935, secs. 2438, 2481, 2482, 2484, 2485.40(1930) 24th Biennial Report of the Iowa State Board of Health,
47-49.
4'Georgia, Code 1933, sec. 84-710 (dentist); Illinois, Rev. Stat.
(Cahill) 1929, ch. 91, par. 82 (dentist) ; South Dakota, Comp. Laws 1929,
sec. 8077-B (veterinarian) ; Virginia, Code 1930, sec. 1646 (dentist);
Wisconsin, Stat. 1935, sec. 101.31 (8) (a) (architect). See also Alabama,
Laws ex. sess. 1936, No. 177, sec. 1, which authorizes the state tax
commission to enter into reciprocal agreements with other states "for an
exchange of rights for the operation of motor vehicles that will be con-
sidered as a fair exchange of rights and privileges." Statutory authorization
to make rules for the reciprocal recognition of licenses has been interpreted
to permit the negotiation of agreements with the boards of other states.
Indiana Stat. (Baldwin) 1934, sec. 5600; see Indiana State Board of Dental
Examiners v. Davis, (1923) 193 Ind. 543, 139 N. E. 311.
42Boards which enter into agreements with Iowa or the states named
in note 41 supra evidently do so without statutory authorization. See also
Thiedemann v. Michigan State Board of Dental Examiners, (1921) 214
Mich. 369, 183 N. W. 228, in which an agreement made without statutory
authorization was condemned.
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professions. The statutes almost invariably invest the boards of
examiners with discretionary authority to decide whether the state
where the applicant formerly resided maintains equal standards for
licensingY3 Now and then a reciprocal statute suggests that the
board of examiners concerned is not to look behind the statutes
of the other states, but to take them at their face value as fixing
the standards for the profession.1 Such a plan, however, seems
to impose too serious limitations upon the discretion of the board,
and could lead to grave errors. For example, changes in the
educational structure of a state might occur which would in no way
be reflected in the statutes. Another solution to this problem is
43The statutes ordinarily say that the board "may," or "may in itsdiscretion," issue a license without examination to an applicant who pre-
sents a license issued by another state maintaining like standards. Such
words cannot be disregarded, and are interpreted as carrying their ordinary
significance and as vesting a broad discretion in the board. Ruffu v. New
Jersey Board of Medical Examiners, (1932) 10 N. J. Mis. 1209, 163 AtI.
15. The decision of a board of examiners in such a matter has been held
not appealable to the courts in the absence of express statutory authorization.
Williams v. Minnesota State Board of Medical Examiners, (1913) 120
Minn. 313, 139 N. W. 500. In Ex parte Hollis, (1909) 82 S. C. 230, 64
S. E. 232, the court did not inquire into the reasons for the board's refusal of
a reciprocal license. In Fernel v. California State Board of Medical Exam-
iners, (1928) 81 Cal. App. 712, 267 Pac. 561, it was held that such decisions
are reviewable by the courts only to correct the arbitrary, unreasonable, or
improper exercise of discretion. For a board to refuse a reciprocal license
merely because of the use in another state of a different system of grading
examinations is an arbitrary exercise of discretion. United States ex rel.
Thomson v. Custis, (1910) 35 App. D. C. 247. The discretion of a board
extends to other related matters in addition to the determination of whether
the other state maintains equal standards, for example, to the question of
whether the candidate is of good moral character. Fernel v. Board of
Medical Examiners, (1928) 81 Cal. App. 712, 267 Pac. 561.
A few instances have been observed when the statutes say that theboard "shall" issue a license on a reciprocal basis. Wisconsin, Stat. 1935,
sec. 101.31 (architects and civil engineers) ; Washington, Rev. Stat. (Rem-
ington) 1932, sec. 8277-10 (barbers), sec. 10030-13 (dentists) ; Arizona,
Rev. Code Supp. 1934, sec. 2545 (dentists). When the statute is in this
form the issuance of the license is mandatory upon the board, after it has
determined that the other state maintains equal standards. Thiedemann v.
Michigan State Board of Dental Examiners, (1921) 214 Mich. 369,
183 N. W. 228.
44Board to issue reciprocal license when other state maintains "equal
statutory requirements," North Dakota, Laws 1929, ch. 95, sec. 9; Montana,
Rev. Code 1935, sec. 3154.3; Mississippi Code 1930, sec. 4306; South Caro-
lina, Code 1932, sec. 5206. Other statutes imply that the administrative
practice in the other state is the determining factor (see for example North
Carolina, Code 1931, sec. 6643), while most reciprocal statutes provide
indefinitely that the license may be issued if the other state "extend a like
privilege." Thiedemann v. Michigan State Board of Dental Examiners,(1921) 214 Mich. 369, 183 N. W. 228, lends support to the view that only
the statute of the other state should be taken into account: "Does the law
of Wisconsin accord the privilege of registration to those registered in
Michigan? We think that an examination of their statute answers this
question in the affirmative."
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to place the burden of proof upon the applicant for the license by
reciprocity, who must show to the satisfaction of the board that
equal standards are maintained by the state which issued his
original license.4 5 This will be regarded by many as an injustice,
for when an administrative board has difficulty in getting the
necessary information, it is hardly likely that an individual can do
so more easily. Reciprocal agreements among boards of examin-
ers might bring them into friendly relations and greatly facilitate
the interstate recognition of licenses. It will occur to some that
another possible solution to these problems would be the develop-
ment of complete uniformity in the legislation of the states relating
to entry into trades and professions. Complete uniformity is,
however, impossible to attain, and it would be undesirable if pos-
sible. A thinly populated, relatively undeveloped state must gen-
erally be content with somewhat lower standards in professions
affected with a public interest.
When a board of examiners is authorized in general terms by
the statute to negotiate reciprocal agreements, it apparently is
invested with something resembling a treaty-making power. The
courts will not inquire into the reasonableness of any specific pro-
vision of such an agreement, because they recognize the discre-
tionary authority of the board, and because they confess inability to
determine whether any provision is integral to the whole, without
which the agreement might have been unacceptable to the parties. 4"
Such an agreement may make not unreasonable additions to the
statutory requirements for the reciprocal recognition of licenses.
4 7
To conclude the discussion of the interstate aspects of the
licensing of trades and professions, it may be observed that the
states are under no obligation to recognize the licenses issued by
other states.48 The right to practice in another state is not one
of the privileges of interstate citizenship guaranteed by the fed-
eral constitution. A license to practice in one state does not
45"The applicant shall, upon the request of the department, be respon-
sible for securing information from the proper authority of the plate from
which he comes, of the standards maintained there and the laws and
rules relating thereto." Nebraska Comp. Stat. 1929, sec. 71-502.48State Board of Dental Examiners v. Davis, (1923) 193 Ind. 543,
139 N. E. 311.
47State Board of Dental Examiners v. Davis, (1923) 193 Ind. 543, 139
N. E. 311, where the additional requirement was that the applicant must be
a member of his state dental society and receive its recommendation. See
also Thomas v. State Board of Health, (1913) 72 W. Va. 776, 79 S. E.
725, where the reciprocal agreement went beyond the statute by requiring
that the applicant must have practiced in his state for one year.
4"The authorities are collected, respecting physicians and surgeons, in
49 L. R. A. (N.S.) 150, and respecting dentists, in 56 L. R. A. (N.S.) 538.
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confer a like right in other states, and is recognized by other
states, if at all, only on principles of comity." Such a license
creates no vested right which other states are bound to recognize." °
Another field in which reciprocal legislation is common is in
the interstate recognition of motor vehicle licenses. Recent com-
pilations of the laws of the forty-eight states relating to motor
vehicle registration show that practically all the states make some
provision for the recognition of the licenses of pleasure vehicles
issued by other states."' The period of time during which states
will permit nonresidents or new residents to operate automobiles
with foreign licenses varies from a few days to a year, or the
balance of the year in which the license was issued. Some states
require the owner to register his automobile, but no fee is charged.
About half of the states provide for such recognition only upon
a reciprocal basis, while the others grant the privilege as a matter
of comity. The latter method is probably better because of the
special difficulties of administering a reciprocal statute relating
to this subject. Some experiments in the enforcement of registra-
tion requirements have been made by the stationing of checkers
at the principal points of entry into the state during the touring
season, and by the checking of parked cars by police. Such
methods, however, are expensive and troublesome, and enforcement
is usually lax. The result is that full recognition is made by
comity, and the statutes might as well be made to conform to the
practice. The National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
have endorsed the method of comity in preference to the method of
reciprocity, with respect to both vehicle registration 52 and drivers'
licenses.5 3 In recent years much attention has been given to the
40People v. Griswold, (1914) 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929.
'
0 State v. Crombie, (1909) 107 Minn. 171, 119 N. W. 660.
"H1-oward, Tax Systems of the World, 6th ed., pp. 152-157; Registra-
tion Fees and Special Taxes for Motor Vehicles (Issued by the National
Highway Users Conference, Washington, D. C., 1936). See also an earlier
compilation, Federal and State Motor Vehicle Taxes in Force January 1,
1928 (Issued by the Motor Vehicle Conference Committee, New York,
1928); and cf. "Reciprocal and Retaliatory Tax Statutes," (1930) 43
Harv. Law Rev. 641-646.
"2See Uniform Motor Vehicle Registration Act, sec. 20, (1926) 9
Uniform Laws Ann. 281, (1926) 51 A. B. A. Rep. 569. This act has been
adopted by ten states: Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Utah. See
(1926) 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 296, and Supp. 1935, 126.
53See Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act,
sec. 4, (1926) 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 319, 51 A. B. A. Rep. 591. This act
has been adopted with changes by twelve states: Colorado, Delaware,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon. Utah, Virginia,
and Washington. See 9 U. L. A. 320, and Supp. 1935, 129.
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possibility of extending the interstate recognition of motor vehicle
licenses to include trucks, busses, and vehicles operated for hire. 4
The states have undisputed authority to require nonresidents
to comply fully with the local laws relating to vehicle registration
and drivers' licenses, and there is no legal obligation requiring the
inclusion of a reciprocal exemption in statutes relating to these
matters.5" The states may not deny the right to operate commer-
cial vehicles in interstate commerce, but aside from this limitation
they have extensive powers to regulate and to tax such vehicles
when owned by nonresidents.16
Reciprocal legislation frequently is used as the method of
bringing about cooperation between two or more states, or of
making arrangements of any other nature relating to matters of
common concern. One such matter dealt with in this way is the
return of nonresident public charges to their states of residence.
The statutes of a number of states authorize the board of control
of public institutions or similar department, or the attorney-
general, to enter into reciprocal agreements with the appropriate
authorities of other states which enact similar legislation in order
to facilitate the return of nonresident public charges, such as in-
sane persons, imbeciles, epileptics, and the inmates of reforma-
tories for minors.5Y The laws of New York and Pennsylvania
seem to contemplate such arrangements only for mental defectives,
while the law of Oregon applies to inmates of all state institutions,
which would seem to include the discharged inmates of state
prisons. All these laws provide for the payment of the expenses
of deportation by the deporting state. In 1917, the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed a model act to
provide for the return of persons of unsound mind to their
residences.58 This act does not contain a reciprocal clause, but
54(1933) 6 State Govt. 3-6; (1934) 7 State Govt. 177-180; (1936) 9
State Govt. 148.
55Kane v. New Jersey, (1916) 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed.
222.
56George, Motor Carrier Regulation in the United States 214-237.
57Arizona, Rev. Code (Struckmeyer) 1928, sec. 2932; California, Pol.
Code (Deering) 1931, sec. 2191; Indiana, Stat. (Baldwin), sec. 4133;
Kansas, Rev. Stat. 1923, sec. 39-109; New Hampshire Laws 1931, ch. 91;
New York, Laws 1924, ch. 550, sec. 6; Oregon Code 1930, sec. 68-2303;
Pennsylvania, Stat. (Purdon) 1936, tit. 50, secs. 121, 122; Vermont,
Pub. Laws 1933, secs. 3954, 3955, 3956; Wisconsin, Stat. 1935, sec. 49.026.
58See Uniform Act to Provide for the Extradition of Persons of
Unsound Mind, (1926) 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 132, 42 A. B. A. Rep. 361.
This act has been adopted by nine states: Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, Nevada, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
See (1926) 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 136, and Supp. 1935, 44.
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institutes instead a procedure similar to that followed in the inter-
state rendition of persons charged with crime. The model act
also differs from the reciprocal plan in providing for the payment
of the expenses of deportation by the state of residence.
Reciprocal legislation sometimes is used as the method of
bringing about cooperation between, or the practical fusion of
administrative authorities. An example of this is the construc-
tion and maintenance of bridges across boundary waters. 9 Statutes
commonly authorize the state highway department, or the county
board concerned, to contract with the similar department of the
adjoining state for the construction of interstate bridges. The
reciprocal feature of such statutes is that they ordinarily have
no effect until the adjoining state enacts similar legislation. An-
other example is the reciprocal appointment of game and fish
wardens, as arranged between Wisconsin and Minnesota. 0 The
respective conservation commissioners may appoint the wardens
of one state as deputy-wardens in the other. Minnesota also offers
to reciprocate in the supervision of commercial fishing in boundary
waters." In the same connection, it may be mentioned that Wis-
consin and Minnesota have provided by reciprocal legislation for
the partial recognition on boundary waters of fishing and hunting
licenses.6'
The nation-wide publicity given to some recent criminal cases
of unusual interest served to focus attention upon the interstate
a'pects of crime control. Reciprocal legislation has been con-
sidered along with interstate compacts as a means for the solution
of the problems common to the states in connection with the
administration of criminal law. Suggestions designed to bring
about interstate cooperation in the control of crime have been
made by the Attorney General's Conference on Crime, held in
Washington in December, 1934; by Congress, in passing the Act
of June 6. 1934, which gives blanket consent to interstate com-
rouIdaho, Laws 1927, ch. 191; Indiana, Laws 1927, chs. 10, 238; New
Jersey, Comp. Stat. Supp. 1930, sec. 26-119C (6) ; New Jersey, Laws
1930, ch. 80; Pennsylvania, Laws 1927, No. 441, sec. 6; Texas, Laws 1927,
ch. 175.
0oWisconsin, Stat. 1935, sec. 29.08; Mason's 1927 Minnesota Stat.,
sec. 5629.
"11Mason's 1927 Minnesota Stat. Supp. 1936, sec. 5595.
62Wisconsin offers to grant reciprocal recognition on boundary waters
to all kinds of fishing licenses issued by Minnesota and Iowa. Stat. 1935,
see. 29.16. Iowa has passed no reciprocal legislation on this subject.
Minnesota reciprocates only with respect to commercial licenses. Mason's
1927 Minnesota Stat. Supp. 1936, sec. 5595 (7). Minnesota also offers to
recognize on Big Stone Lake all kinds of fishing licenses and licenses to
take water fowl issued by South Dakota. Stat. Supp. (Mason), sec. 5647.
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pacts relating to the enforcement of criminal law;63 by the Na-
tional Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; by the Interstate
Crime Commission; and by other agencies.
There were already some precedents for the use of reciprocal
legislation to facilitate the enforcement of criminal law. Minne-
sota and Wisconsin for some time have granted' extraterritorial
powers on a reciprocal basis to game wardens, permitting the
officers of one state to pursue and capture violators in the terri-
tory of the other state.6 4 For a number of years, all the New
England states and Iowa, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
and Wisconsin have had statutes-not all of which are reciprocal
in character-providing a means to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses at criminal trials in the courts of other states.65 The general
enactment of uniform legislation along these lines is now being
advocated by influential agencies.
In 1935, South Dakota enacted a law which in very broad terms
grants power to the peace officers of reciprocating states to pursue
persons charged with felony, and to capture them within its
boundaries. 6 The Uniform Act on Close Pursuit, sponsored by
the Interstate Crime Commission, which has been adopted by
four states, 7 is not reciprocal in form. Under its terms, a state
grants by comity the privilege to the officers of another state
to follow fugitives in hot pursuit across the state boundary; but
a person so captured must be taken immediately before a magis-
trate for a hearing, and possible commitment to await extradition
proceedings. The Uniform Act on Close Pursuit seems to meet
the problem squarely, without introducing the sweeping invasion
of territorial sovereignty and individual liberty implied in the
South Dakota act. The Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance
of Witnesses, approved by the National Commissioners and the
American Bar Association in 193 1,68 and now adopted by thirteen
6373d Cong. 2nd Sess., ch. 406.
64Wisconsin, Stat. 1935, sec. 29.08; Mason's 1927 Minnesota Stat. sec.
5646. Vermont makes a reciprocal grant of jurisdiction permitting Massa-
chusetts' officers to serve criminal process in buildings situated partly in
both states. Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, secs. 2544, 2545.65See Report of the Committee on Securing Compulsory Attendance
of Nonresident Witnesses in Civil and Criminal Cases, (1922) Handbook of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
Proceedings 358-361; Interstate Extradition of Witnesses, (1902) 6 Law
Notes 159-160; Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Klaus, (1911) 145 App.
Div. 798, 130 N. Y. S. 713.66South Dakota, Laws 1935., ch. 115.
67(1936) 9 State Govt. 17, 106. The text -of the Uniform Act on
Close Pursuit may be seen conveniently as Rhode Island, Acts 1935-36, ch.
2383, and Virginia, Laws 1936, ch. 188.68(1931) Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on
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states, 9 contains a reciprocal clause. It provides a means to
require residents of the enacting state to attend as witnesses in
criminal cases in the courts of states that have enacted similar
legislation. This desirable aid in the administration of criminal
justice thus exists at the present time among over one third of the
states. Other measures to bring about interstate cooperation in
the control of crime include the Uniform Act on Criminal Extradi-
tion, sponsored by the National Commissioners, and containing
no reciprocal provision ;0 the plan to negotiate interstate compacts
to arrange for the reciprocal supervision of parolees and probation-
ers ;" and various proposals to create joint crime detection labora-
tories and similar agencies by interstate compacts.
A question which deserves serious consideration is whether
interstate cooperation in these matters can be brought about better
by uniform and reciprocal legislation or by the method of inter-
state compacts. The variations in the legislation authorizing the
negotiation of compacts, 72 and the large number of jurisdictions to
be brought together in the negotiations, strongly suggest that the
desired result might be obtained more quickly and easily by uni-
form and reciprocal legislation. Ideally, the compact method is
doubtless the better, because the conditions of cooperation may
be made clearer and more certain-and this is especially important
with respect to the grant of extraterritorial privileges.73 In the
absence of a binding compact or contract, it must usually be left
to the administrative authorities to determine whether the legis-
lation of another state satisfies the conditions of cooperation
stipulated in a particular statute. But when cooperation is desired
Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 41-69, 120-122, 417-423; (1935) 9
Uniform Laws Ann. Supp. 6.6DArkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Nevada, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
See (1935) 9 Uniform Laws Ann. Supp. 6.
70This act was adopted in 1926. (1935) 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 108.
It has been enacted by fourteen states. (1935) 9 Uniform Laws Ann. Supp.
26.
71See Lutz, Crime and Punishment: The Best Use of Parole Requires
Interstate Cooperation, (1936) 9 State Govt. 133, and cf. Indiana, Stat.
Supp. 1936, secs. 9-3001 to 9-3004; Michigan, Comp. Stat. Supp. 1935(Mason), secs. 17509-1 to 17509-4; Mason's 1927 Minnesota Stat. Supp.
1936, sec. 10778-1; Rhode Island, Acts 1935-36, ch. 2381.
7 2See a mimeographed report on Interstate Crime Compacts, issued by
the Council of State Governments, October 7, 1935.73Cf. Freund, Concurring Memorandum to Report of the Committee
on Interstate Compacts, (1921) Handbook of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 357-361. See
also J. P. Chamberlain, Current Legislation, (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 207-209.
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among all the states on a number of subjects, the compact method
is so cumbersome as to be impractical.
Uniform legislation, while less perfect in these respects, may
accomplish the essential purpose of a compact in a much simpler
way. Legislation which is both uniform and reciprocal has the
special advantages of protecting the rights of citizens and the
territorial sovereignty of the states during the progress of the
movement towards uniformity, and of offering an incentive to
other states to adopt the uniform legislation. The chief objection
to reciprocal legislation as a means of securing cooperation in
the control of crime is that this would extend reciprocal legislation
into a definitely political field. It is ordinarily a means of dealing
with the less spectacular matters of distinctly secondary importance.
The further objection that reciprocal legislation, when relating
to a political matter, becomes an interstate compact and needs
the consent of Congress, is readily met by the observation that
the advance consent of Congress, contained in the Act of June
6, 1934, is broad enough to cover any possible uses of reciprocal
legislation in connection with the interstate control of crime.74
Another use of reciprocal legislation is to arrange for the
interchange of information between officials in charge of tax
collection or law enforcement. The one instance in which this
has been realized to any extent is in connection with the exchange
of income tax records. The personal income tax laws of some
states grant to the appropriate authorities of the United States
or any state the right to inspect their income tax records, provided
a similar privilege is granted on the other side.75 This provision
had its origin in the model personal income tax law of the
National Tax Association.7 6  In 1932, a committee of the National
Tax Association prepared a draft law designed to prevent the
bootlegging of gasoline by providing for the reciprocal exchange
of information between administrative authorities regarding ship-
74See Dean, The Interstate Compact-A Device for Crime Repression,
(1934) 1 Law and Contemp. Prob. 460-471, at p. 470. The South Dakota
act extending extraterritorial privileges to the peace officers of neighboring
states on a reciprocal basis contains the statement that "this act ...is
authorized by the Act of Congress of June 6, 1934." South Dakota, Laws
1935, ch. 115, sec. 4.75Arizona, Rev. Code Supp. 1934, sec. 318 2z21 (c); California, Codes
Supp. 1935 (Deering), p. 1995, sec. 33 (c) ; Kentucky, Stat. (Baldwin) 1936,
sec. 4281b-ll (2) ; Mason's 1927 Minnesota Stat. Supp. 1936, sec. 2394-56
(a); Montana, Code 1935, sec. 2295.30 (3) ; Washington, Laws 1935, ch.
178, sec. 67 (f) ; West Virginia, Laws 1935, ch. 89, sec. 57(3).
76See Model Personal Income Tax Act, sec. 805 (3), (1921) 6 Bul.
Nat'l Tax Ass'n 100; (1928) 21 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 422.
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ments across state lines.7 7  In 1936, New York passed a statute
providing for the reciprocal exchange of the records of violations
of the motor vehicle laws by nonresidents.71
One instance has been observed of the use of reciprocal legis-
lation to arrange for the payment of tuition for nonresident high-
school pupils.70
The code of Georgia has a peculiar provision to the effect that
entry to her courts is to be had only upon a reciprocal basis.8"
Much attention has been given in recent years to reciprocal
legislation as a method of avoiding double and multiple inheritance
taxation. An early and short-lived reciprocity movement was
initiated in 1903 by the enactment of a Connecticut statute provid-
ing for the remission of inheritance taxes on the personal property
of nonresident decedents whose states did not levy a similar tax
upon the estates of Connecticut residents. In the following year,
West Virginia enacted a similar reciprocal provision, and Vermont,
more generously, exempted all property of nonresident decedents
without any demand for a reciprocal exemption in favor of her
citizens. In 1907, Massachusetts passed a reciprocal statute; in
1909 Kansas followed suit, and Maine enacted an exemption pro-
vision similar to that of Vermont. In 1911, Minnesota adopted a
reciprocal statute,8 ' but here the movement stopped. It will be ob-
served that these statutes applied to all kinds of personal property.
The Kansas and Massachusetts statutes were held to create the ex-
emption, not only in favor of a reciprocating state, but also as
between those states and a state which exempted all estates of
nonresidents from inheritance taxation. 82 The Minnesota statute
was, however, interpreted as creating no exemption in favor of
residents of states which either levied no inheritance tax at all or
levied no tax in like circumstances. 13 These interpretations were,
77(1932) 25 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 184.
78(1936) 9 State Govt. 106, 143. On the reciprocal exchange of in-
formation relating to the payment of inheritance taxes, see infra note 116.
70Nebraska, Comp. Stat. 1929, sec. 79-905.
8OGeorgia, Code 1933, sec. 79-305.
8lConnecticut, Laws 1903, ch. 63, sec. 2, Gallup's Appeal, (1904) 76
Conn. 617, 57 At. 699; Kansas, Gen. Stat. (Dassler) 1909, sec. 9266;
Maine, Laws 1909, ch. 187, sec. 7; Massachusetts, Acts 1907, ch. 563, sec.
3, re-enacted, 1909, ch. 490, pt. 4, sec. 3, 1911, ch. 502, sec. 1; Minnesota,
Laws 1911, ch. 209, sec. 2, subdiv. 2; Vermont, Laws 1904, No. 30, secs.
3, 4; West Virginia, Laws 1904, ch. 6, sec. 6.
8 2State v. Davis, (1913) 88 Kan. 849, 129 Pac. 1197; Bliss v. Bliss,
(1915) 221 Mass. 201, 109 N. E. 148.
8 3State ex rel. Graft v. Probate Court, (1915) 128 Minn. 371, 150 N. W.
1094.
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of course, entirely consistent with the principle of reciprocity,
which implies the granting of exemptions on both sides.
In 1907, Connecticut repealed her reciprocal statute and sub-
stituted for it a retaliatory feature applying only to stock and reg-
istered bonds of domestic corporations.8 " The effect of this stat-
ute was that stock and registered bonds belonging to the estates
of nonresident decedents were subjected to the inheritance tax only
when the domiciliary state would in like circumstances tax such
property belonging to Connecticut residents. While this statute
was in effect, Connecticut did not collect inheritance taxes on
stocks and bonds of domestic corporations when belonging to
estates of persons resident in states which levied no inheritance
tax at all, or which levied inheritance taxes only upon property
physically present within the jurisdiction; but it was used to re-
taliate against eight states which at that time did tax the stocks
and bonds of domestic corporation when located outside the state
and owned by nonresident decedents8 5 West Virginia, in 1909,
changed her reciprocal law to a retaliatory one similar to that of
Connecticut.86 The National Tax Association, in its early con-
ferences, condemned these retaliatory statutes.87
All these reciprocal, retaliatory, and exemption laws were re-
pealed soon after their enactment, the last falling in 1917.88 The
failure of this early movement to avoid multiple inheritance taxa-
tion probably was due to the fact that no organized group chose
to support the idea of reciprocity with any vigor.8 9 Three states
later passed reciprocal laws offering to exempt from inheritance
taxation the tangible property of resident decedents, when the
property was located outside the enacting state, if the state in
84Connecticut, Laws 1907, ch. 179, secs. 1, 6.
85See The Reciprocal Feature of the Act Concerning Taxes on In-
heritances, Connecticut Public Document, No. 48, Special No. 4 (Hartford,
1908), and remarks of the then Connecticut tax commissioner, W. H. Corbin,
(1908) 2 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 171-194.
86West Virginia, Laws 1909, ch. 63, sec. 6.
87(1907) 1 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n xviii; (1908) 2 Proc. Nat'l Tax
Ass'n 26.
-Connecticut, Laws 1915, ch. 332, secs. 3, 7, 14; Kansas, Laws 1913,
ch. 330, sec. 1; Maine, Laws 1917, ch. 266, sec. 2; Massachusetts, Laws
1912, ch. 678, sec. 2; Minnesota, Laws 1913, ch. 565, sec. 1; Vermont, Laws
1912, No. 60, sec. 3; West Virginia, Laws 1913, ch. 25, sec. 6.
89In 1910, the National Tax Association adopted a draft of a model
inheritance tax law. For the avoidance of multiple taxation it relied, not
upon reciprocity, but upon the principle that each state should tax only that
portion of the tangible personal property of nonresident decedents actually
present within its jurisdiction. (1910) 4 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 26, 279-290.
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which the property was located made a similar exemption in favor
of its resident decedents.90
As the inheritance tax became more common among the
states, the problem of multiple taxation grew more serious. In
their search for revenues, the states taxed, not only the gross
estates of their residents, but also all property of nonresidents
which could by any device be brought under their taxing power.
In the years immediately following the World War, much study
was given to the problems of inheritance taxation, and particularly
to the evils of multiple taxation. There was never any serious ob-
jection to the taxation of real property by the state in which it is
located, and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Frick v. Pennsylvania9' in 1925 established the rule that tangible
personal property can be subjected to inheritance taxation only
by the state in which it has an actual situs. Thus the problem was
reduced to devising means to avoid the taxation of intangible
property by more than one state, and, until later decisions by the
highest court in the land supplied a more perfect solution,92 re-
ciprocal legislation proved a useful means to this end.
In his message approving the Revenue Act of 1924, President
Coolidge recommended the correction of abuses in state inheri-
tance taxation.93 The seventeenth annual meeting of the National
Tax Association at St. Louis, September 15-19, 1924, gave much
consideration to the reform of inheritance taxation, but reached no
decision other than to propose a special conference on inheritance
and estate taxation. 4 Before this special conference convened in
g0Arizona, Laws 1922, ch. 26, sec. 4 (7), Code (Struckmeyer) 1928,
sec. 3162; Montana, Laws 1923, ch. 65, sec. 4 (4); North Dakota, Laws
1919, ch. 225, sec. 1 (1), Comp. Laws Supp. 1925, sec. 2346b1 (1). These
provisions were rendered meaningless by the decision in Frick v. Pennsyl-
vania, (1925) 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L. Ed. 1058; cf. Pinkerton
and Millsaps, Inheritance and Estate Taxes, sec. 261.
1 (1925) 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. C. 603, 69 L. Ed. 1058.92The rules as now developed prevent all forms of double and multiple
inheritance taxation by the states, except that arising from claims that a
decedent was domiciled in two or more states. The decisions have been
discussed in many articles in the law reviews, such as the following:
Rottschaefer, The Power of the States to Tax Intangibles, (1931) 15
MINNESOTA LAW REvIEW 741-766; Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction to Im-
pose Taxes, (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 305-332; Brady, Death Taxes: Recent
Statutory and Judicial Solutions of Multiple Taxation, (1930) 16 A. B. A. J.
532-535; Lowndes, Tendencies in the Taxation of Intangibles, (1930) 17
Va. Law Review, 146-163; Mason, Jurisdiction for the Purpose of Imposing
Inheritance Taxes, (1931) 29 Mich. Law Review 324-338.
9 3See his Address at the National Conference on Inheritance and
Estates Taxes, Washington, D. C., February 19, 1925, (1925) 10 Bul. Nat'l
Tax Ass'n 169-171.
94(1925) 10 Bul. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 3.
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Washington in February, 1925, the discussions at the St. Louis
meeting bore fruit in another way. In December, 1924, the Pennsyl-
vania tax commission, under the leadership of its chairman, Frank-
lin S. Edmonds, invited the tax commissioners of neighboring
states to meet with it informally at Harrisburg to consider prob-
lems of multiple inheritance taxation.95 Out of the discussions at
the series of conferences so initiated arose the plan of reciprocity.
The solution actually favored by the tax commissioners at that
time was the unconditional abandonment by all states of taxation
of the intangibles of nonresident decedents. They recognized,
however, the difficulties in getting their legislatures to take such
action with no guaranty that other states would enact uniform
legislation. The idea of reciprocity appealed to them as just the
device to safeguard the interests of states, and at the same time to
accomplish the desired reform.9 7 After an exchange of corres-
pondence with the New York and Massachusetts commissions, the
Pennsylvania commission recommended a reciprocal measure to
the Pennsylvania legislature at its 1925 session, which enacted it
into law, thus formally initiating the reciprocity movement in in-
heritance taxation.98 The legislatures of New York, Massachusetts,
and Connecticut, then in session, quickly followed suit.99
In the meantime the special conference of the National Tax
Association met at Washington, February 19-20, 1925.10 The idea
of reciprocity was not unknown to the members of this confer-
ence, but it entered very little into the discussions."0 ' The con-
clusion was reached that the taxation of the estates of nonresident
decedents ought to be abandoned, but reciprocity was not endorsed
9 See Edmonds, Progress in Reciprocity in State Inheritance Taxation,
(1925) 18 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 246-254, at p. 246.90(1927) 20 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 414, 416, 432.97See Edmonds, Reciprocity in Inheritance Taxation, (1927) 20 Proc.
Nat'l Tax Ass'n 415-431.
98(1925) 18 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 249; Pennsylvania, Laws 1925, No.
391, sec. 1 (d).
99New York, Laws 1925, ch. 143; Massachusetts, Laws 1925, ch. 338;
Connecticut, Laws 1925, ch. 239; Gerstenberg, A Brief Survey of the
Statutory Changes of 1925 in Inheritance Taxes, (1925) 10 Bul. Nat'l
Tax Ass'n 265-267.
160On the planning of this conference see (1925) 10 Bul. Nat'l Tax
Ass'n, 3, 69, 101.
10 President Coolidge referred to reciprocity in his opening address.
See his address, (1925) 10 Bul. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 169-171. R. L. Brad-
ford definitely proposed reciprocity; see his paper, Uncertainties in
Death Duty Legislation and Interpretations, Proceedings of the National
Conference on Inheritance and Estates Taxes, held at the New Willard
Hotel, Washington, D. C., February 19-20, 1925, 12-24, at p. 23. See pp.
81, 83, 84, for mention of it, mostly unfavorable, by other members.
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as a means of getting legislatures to take this action. To study the
problems involved more thoroughly, this conference authorized its
chairman to appoint a committee to report to a second special
conference.102 Upon the recommendation of this committee, the
second conference at New Orleans, in November, 1925, definitely
endorsed reciprocity. 10 3 A model reciprocal statute was adopted
at the same time.10 4 The National Tax Association, then in con-
ference, formally gave its approval to the reciprocity movement.0 1
In anticipation of the 1927 sessions of the legislatures, other
organizations took up the idea of reciprocity in inheritance taxa-
tion. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States ascertained
by referendum that its member organizations were strongly in
favor of the plan.106 These efforts were not without effect, for in
1927 eight more states adopted reciprocity. 10 7 With these successes
the movement gained momentum, the lists being entered by such
organizations as the Investment Bankers Association and the
American Bankers Association.0 " In 1928, the National Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws proposed a uniform reciprocal
law which closely followed the model act of the National Tax
102See a statement of the results of the conference, (1925) 10 Bul.
Nat'l Tax Ass'n 166.
103See the report of this committee in Proceedings of the Second
National Conference on Inheritance and Estate Taxation, held at New
Orleans, November 10, 1925, 23 seq., and for an analysis see Brady, Statu-
tory Solutions of Multiple Death Taxation, (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 147-150.
'10 Proc. of the Second Special Conference 77.
'O1The 1925 conference adopted a resolution endorsing the plan. (1925)
18 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 244, 366-367. The 1926 conference resolved that
a committee should be appointed to study reciprocity as a practical solution
for inheritance tax problems. (1926) 19 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 377. This
committee reported to the next conference, strongly favoring the idea. (127)
20 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 415-431, 466-467.
100Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Referendum No. 49
on Taxation Committee's Report on State and Local Taxation, October 23,
1926. Reciprocity was approved by the vote of 2,290 to 100. See (1927)
Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States 41.
'
07Kentucky, Laws 1926, ch. 176, sec. 2; California, Laws 1927, ch.
646; Georgia, Laws 1927, No. 331, sec. 5; Illinois, Laws 1927, p. 748;
Maine, Laws 1927, ch. 231; Maryland, Laws 1927, ch. 350; New Hampshire,
Laws 1927, ch. 104; Ohio, Laws 1927, p. 103; Oregon, Laws 1927, ch. 118,
sec. 1. See also Sayler, Reciprocal Inheritance Tax Legislation, (1927)
13 Bul. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 4-6; Brady, Statutory Solutions of Multiple Death
Taxation, (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 147.
1012 Public Dollar, No. 1 (January, 1929). On the further activities
of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, see the files of the
Public Dollar; Moore, Fiscal Problems of the States, a pamphlet published
by the Finance Department; and the resolutions adopted at the sixteenth
annual meeting held at Washington, D. C., May 11, 1928.
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Association.' 0 In 1929, thirteen more states joined the reciprocity
ranks, bringing the movement to its high-water mark.110
The states which levy no inheritance tax on the intangible per-
sonal property of nonresident decedents ordinarily have been
counted as within the reciprocal ranks, so that the movement has
seemed to embrace almost all the states."' The elimination of mul-
tiple taxation was, however, never as general as the proponents
of the plan of reciprocity wished to make out. This was true be-
cause of considerable variation in the reciprocal legislation on the
subject, and also because of certain administrative difficulties
which developed. Most of the states followed quite closely the
model statutes of the National Tax Association and the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, both of which provide
that the exemption shall be made, if (1) the state of residence
levies no inheritance tax upon the intangibles of nonresident de-
cedents, or (2) the state of residence has a reciprocal law. This
left doubt as to whether the exemption should be made in favor of
residents of a state which levied no inheritance tax of any kind.
A few states stipulated that the exemption would not apply in such
circumstances. The statutes of some states contained only the
second of the two alternatives of the model acts, and others offered
to make the exemption only in favor of the residents of states
which unconditionally exempted the intangibles of nonresident
decedents." 2 The situation was further complicated because the
existence of reciprocity depended, not only upon the interpretation
of the statutes, but also upon the administrative practice, or even
the court decisions, of other states."1
109(1927) 52 A. B. A. Rep. 404; (1928) 53 A. B. A. Rep. 90, 92, (1928)
9 Uniform Laws Ann. 381, and Supp. 1935, 174.
11OMississippi, Laws 1928, ch. 191, sec. 3; Arkansas, Laws 1929, No.
106, sec. 2; Idaho, Laws 1929, ch. 243, sec. 8; Indiana, Laws 1929, ch. 65,
sec. 4; Iowa, Laws 1929, ch. 203; Michigan, Laws 1929, No. 231; Missouri,
Laws 1929, ch. 102; North Carolina, Laws 1929, ch. 345, sec. 13; New
Mexico, Laws 1929, ch. 86; South Carolina, Laws 1929, No. 194; Texas,
Laws 1st sess. 1929, ch. 50; Washington, Laws 1929, ch. 220; West Virginia,
Laws 1929, ch. 57, sec. 6; Wyoming, Laws 1929, ch. 111.
"'In the table in Tax Systems of the World 5th ed., at pp. 110-111,
only nine states are listed as not being members of the reciprocal group,
as follows: Arizona, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah.
1l2The reciprocal states are classified into these different groups in
Reciprocal and Retaliatory Tax Statutes, (1930) 43 Harv. Law Rev. 641-646.1 13In Commonwealth v. Taylor's Executor, (1929) 297 Pa. St. 335,
147 Atl. 71, the court looked at the administrative practice in New York
to determine whether reciprocity existed. In City Bank Farmers' Trust
Company v. New York Central R. R. Co., (1930) 253 N. Y. 49, 170 N. E.
489, the court looked at the Pennsylvania decision just cited for the same
purpose.
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All these doubts were, of course, swept away by the recent de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court relating to the situs
of personal property for inheritance tax purposes, and the re-
ciprocal statutes are no longer necessary as a partial solution of
the problems of multiple taxation. The experience with reciprocal
legislation in connection with inheritance taxation clearly reveals
all its defects as a device for the solution of interstate problems.
The difficulties encountered in trying to get all, or nearly all, the
states to adopt a reciprocal statute are the same as for a uniform
statute. The variations in the plan which many state legislatures
will inevitably introduce create uncertainties, and may defeat the
principle of reciprocity. As a method of checking multiple in-
heritance taxation, decisions of the Supreme Court under the due
process clause proved infinitely superior to reciprocal legislation,
but that solution is not always available. These incidents also re-
vealed the special advantage of reciprocal legislation, which is to
enable states to trade valuable considerations to the mutual ad-
vantage of all concerned.
One of the by-products of the movement for reciprocity in in-
heritance taxation was the simplification of the administration of
the estates of nonresident decedents. Shortly after the first of the
reciprocal statutes went into effect, the taxing authorities of sev-
eral states agreed in conference that securities making up part of
an estate to be relieved of taxation through reciprocity may be
transferred immediately upon the filing with the transfer agent or
institution concerned of the affidavit of the executor, to the effect
that the deceased was a resident of a reciprocal state. Thus, the
employment of counsel, the filing of copies of the will and other
documents, the securing of tax waivers, and other inconveniences
formerly encountered are now frequently avoided." 4
More recently, attention has been directed to the fact that the
intangibles of an estate may escape taxation altogether, if the estate
is administered in the courts of a state other than that in which
the deceased was resident." 5 The National Tax Association is at
the present time sponsoring, already with considerable success,
another reciprocal statute designed to make such avoidance of tax-
114Progress of Reciprocity in Inheritance Taxation, (1925) 11 Bul. Nat'l
Tax Ass'n 9-10; Smith, A Substitute for Inheritance Tax Waivers: Benefits
Derived from Reciprocity in Inheritance Taxation, (1926) 12 Bul. Nat'l
Tax Ass'n 41-43; Brady, Death Taxes-Flat Rates and Reciprocity, (1928)
14 A. B. A. Jour. 309-312.
"15 Re Martin, (1931) 255 N. Y. 389, 173 N. E. 878.
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ation an impossibility.1 , Another problem which has arisen from
the rule that intangible property can be taxed only by the domi-
ciliary state is that of double domicile in inheritance taxation. Due
to the uncertainties of the rules for determining the domicile for
taxation purposes, an estate may be required to pay inheritance
taxes in two states. A committee of the National Tax Association,
which considered this problem, rejected reciprocal legislation in
favor of interstate compacts as the method of solving this diffi-
culty.1
17
The general problem of the duty of one state to enforce the
tax claims of another has come to the front in recent years.'1 It
has been held that in some circumstances the tax claims of one
state are entitled to full faith and credit in another state.1" 0 In
1935, North Carolina enacted a reciprocal law, providing for the
recognition and enforcement in her courts of liabilities for taxes
imposed by other states."20 North Carolina officials are authorized
to bring suits in the courts of other states for the collection of
taxes, and the officials of reciprocating states are admitted to the
courts of North Carolina for the same purpose. The general adop-
tion of reciprocal legislation of this kind would solve a perplex-
ing problem, and bring a large amount of property within the
reach of the taxing powers of the states.
The recent decisions operating to prevent multiple inheritance
taxation have not affected income taxation.'21 On the contrary,
11The model statute was brought forward in 1931 as a committee re-
port, and was adopted by the Association. It provides that the executor of
a nonresident decedent must file proof that the inheritance taxes have been
duly paid to the domiciliary state; in the absence of such proof, a reciprocat-
ing state agrees to notify the appropriate authorities of the domiciliary state,
who may demand an accounting; and the executor will not be discharged un-
til settlement is made. See (1931) 24 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 381, 393.
Fourteen states have so far enacted this statute. See (1933) 26 Proc. Nat'l
Tax Ass'n 260; Manning, State Tax Legislation, 1935, (1935) 28 Proc.
Nat'l Tax Ass'n 27-60, at p. 37; Maryland, Laws spec. sess., 1936, ch. 124,
sec. 2.
"
T See Report of the Committee of National Tax Association on
Double Domicile in Inheritance Taxation, (1935) 28 Proc. Nat'l Tax
Ass'n 201-212.
"18 Manning, State Tax Legislation 1935, (1935) 28 Proc. Nat'l Tax
Ass'n 27; Blinkoff, Extra-territorial Collection of Taxes Validly Imposed,
(1933) 18 Corn. L. Q. 581-586.
1 9 People of the State of New York v. Coe Mfg. Co., (1932) 10
N. 3. Misc. 1161, 162 Atl. 872; Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Com-
pany, (1935) 296 U. S. 268, 56 Sup. Ct. 229.
12ONorth Carolina, Code 1935, secs. 7880 (194) a, b.
'
21Beuscher, Overlapping State Income Tax Laws, (1933) 8 Wis. Law
Rev. 320-333; Saxe, State Income Taxation of Nonresidents, (1935) 28
Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 215-221.
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judicial sanction has recently been given to the long established
practice of the levy of taxes upon the entire net income of resi-
dents. 122 The states also have the undoubted right to tax the in-
comes of nonresidents, and of foreign corporations, if derived
from property located within the state or business carried on with-
in the state.12 3 A large majority of the states which now have net
income tax laws reach out in all these directions, thus creating
many possibilities of multiple taxation.1 2 4 These problems have
not seemed very serious because of the limited use of this form
of taxation by the states; but with the present rapid spread of in-
come taxation a solution will be as necessary as with inheritance
taxation in the last decade. The solution for some time advocated
by the National Tax Association, which is to encourage the states
to abandon the taxation of the incomes of nonresidents and to tax
business only upon the income derived within the jurisdiction, has
made little headway.1 21 The improbability of a ready solution by
12-Lawrence v. Mississippi, (1931) 286 U. S. 276, 76 L. Ed. 1102, 52
Sup. Ct. 556.
123Shaffer v. Carter, (1920) 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. Ed. 445, 40 Sup. Ct.
221. 1 2 1Thirty-three states have personal net income tax laws, as follows,
the citation in each instance referring to matters pertinent to this study:
Alabama, Laws, ex. sess. 1932, No. 117, secs. l(b), 14, 22; Arizona, Code
Supp. 1934, secs. 3182b, 3182u, 3182x; Arkansas, Laws 1929, Act 118, secs.
3, 15; California, Codes Supp. 1935 (Deering), p. 1968, Act 8494, secs. 5,
25; Delaware, Laws 1929, ch 8, sec. 1(b) ; Georgia, Code 1933, sec. 92-3112;
Idaho, Code 1932, secs. 61-2412, 61-2416, as amended, Laws 1933, ch. 159,
secs. 4, 7, sec. 61-2428; Iowa, Code 1935, secs. 6943-f5, 29; Kansas, Laws
1933, ch. 320, see. 3; Kentucky, Stat. (Baldwin) 1936, secs. 4281b-14, 15, 16;
Louisiana, Laws 1934, No. 21, sec. 34, as amended, Laws 1936, No. 143,
sec. 1; Massachusetts, Gen. Laws 1932, ch. 62, sec. 25; Mason's 1927 Minne-
sota Stat. Supp. 1936, secs. 2394-3, 2394-23; Mississippi, Laws 1934, ch. 120,
sees. 3, 7 (11), 37, as amended, Laws 1936, ch. 151, sec. 11; Missouri, Rev.
Stat. 1929, secs. 10115, 10120; Montana, Rev. Code 1935, secs. 2295.3,
2295.7(3), 2295.8(11) ; New Hampshire, Pub. Laws 1926, ch. 65, secs. 2,
3 (1); New Mexico, Laws 1929, ch. 85, sec. 29, as amended, Laws, spec.
sess. 1934, ch. 29, sec. 3, and sees. 1, 21, 24, 25 of original act; New York,
Con. Laws (Cahill) 1930, ch. 61, secs. 214, 351, 351a, 359, 363; North
Carolina, Code 1935, secs. 7880 (125), (140) (10), (143); North Dakota,
Laws 1931, ch. 283, sec. 2; Ohio, Laws 1931, S. B: No. 323 (p. 714 seq.),
secs. 5328-1, 5328-2, 5388, 5638; Oklahoma, Stat. Supp. 1936, secs. 12498e,
f, h (d) ; Oregon, Code Supp. 1935, secs. 69-1307, 1503; Pennsylvania, Stat.
(Purdon) 1936, tit. 72, secs. 3402-201, 3402-303 (c), 3402-310; South
Carolina, Code 1932, secs. 2437, 2439, 2449(9), 2451; South Dakota, Laws
1935, ch. 205, secs. 5, 15a; Tennessee, Code 1932, sec. 1090; Utah, Rev. Stat.
1933, secs. 80-13-21, 80-14-1; Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, secs. 872, 881, 888;
Virginia, Code (Tax Code), secs. 38, 39, 40, 54; West Virginia, Laws 1935,
ch. 89, secs. 3, 4, 34; Wisconsin, Stat. 1935, secs. 71.01, 71.02 (j) 3 (d).
l1;See the model system of state and local taxation, (1919) 12 Proc.
Nat'l Tax Ass'n 426-470, and the model personal net income tax law,
(1921) 6 Bul. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 100, (1928) 21 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 422.
This plan has been recently reaffirmed; see (1933) 26 Proc. Nat'l Tax
Ass'n 353-420, at p. 366.
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means of judicial decisions as with inheritance taxation, or of some
type of federal interference, suggests that the possibilities of re-
ciprocal legislation should be explored thoroughly.
Reciprocal legislation as a method of affording relief from
multiple income taxation was first introduced by the state of New
York in 1919. New York then, as now, taxed the entire incomes
of residents wherever derived, and the incomes of nonresidents
earned or derived within the state. It will be obvious that, if New
Jersey had a similar law, her citizens earning incomes in New
York would be subjected to double taxation. To mitigate this evil,
and at the same time to protect the interests of her citizens, New
York in 1919 enacted a reciprocal credit provision. The principle
was that a nonresident in calculating his income tax to be paid to
New York might deduct the amount of tax to which he was liable
in his own state, if the other state made a similar provision in
favor of residents of New York." 6 Thus, if the rates of taxation
were the same, a nonresident would pay no tax at all to New York,
provided of course that his own state enacted reciprocal legisla-
tion. This provision was amended in 1920 to allow the same credit
to residents of a state which, while levying a tax upon the entire
incomes of residents, levies no tax on the incomes of nonresi-
dents.'27 Residents of a state having no income tax law cannot
profit from this provision of the New York law. This is consistent
with the principle of reciprocity, for otherwise the citizens of New
York would gain no advantage to compensate for the revenue re-
linquished by their state.
It will be clear that if all the states modeled their income tax
laws after that of New York in these particulars, there would be
no possibility of multiple taxation, except as occurring because of
differences in the rate of taxation. Only ten states have done so,
namely, Alabama, California, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia. Thus, reciprocity in income taxation exists among a
group of eighteen states, including the eleven states having re-
ciprocal provisions, and seven states having income tax laws but
not taxing nonresidents, namely, Delaware, Iowa, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont.
There is another statutory device for the avoidance of multiple
126New York, Laws 1919, ch. 627, sec. 363; see also remarks of
Seligman, claiming the authorship of this section, (1919) 5 Bul. Nat'l Tax
Ass'n 40-50.
127New York, Laws 1920, ch. 691, sec. 2.
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income taxation which has been enacted with variations by nine
states - California, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. 128 These
states resign all or part of the revenue which they might gain by
taxing the incomes of their residents derived outside of the state,
and upon which an income tax is paid to another state. This plan
does not completely eliminate the possibilities of multiple taxation
on the incomes of residents of the states involved, because the
exemption or credit is not ordinarily allowed on all forms of in-
come. No element of reciprocity is present in this plan, because
there is no way in which a state can demand a favor on the other
side to compensate it for its lost revenue.
Corporations doing business in two or more states are not as
likely to be subjected to multiple income taxation. Twenty-nine
states levy taxes based upon the net incomes of corporations, 129 but
only six of these-Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, and South Carolina-impose the tax upon the en-
tire net income of domestic corporations. All the other states re-
quire domestic and foreign corporations alike to pay taxes upon
the net income derived from property or business within the state.
Of the seven states which tax the entire net incomes of domestic
corporations, only two-North Carolina and South Carolina-have
statutory provisions to relieve their corporations from multiple
taxation. These two states provide that domestic corporations, in
paying income tax to their home states, may deduct the amount of
tax to which they have become liable elsewhere with respect
to income derived from property located in another state or busi-
ness carried on within another state.
All the examples of reciprocal legislation have now been dealt
with, and attention may be directed to the closely related subject of
retaliatory legislation. There has been much confusion in the use
of "reciprocal" and "retaliatory," 130 which is probably due to the
128New Hampshire exempts its residents from taxation upon the inter-
est on deposits in savings banks, building and loan associations, or savings
departments located in New Hampshire or in any state that similarly
exempts its residents from taxation on deposits in New Hampshire institu-
tions.
IL29AIl the states levying personal net income taxes, except Delaware,
New Hampshire and West Virginia, also levy taxes on the net incomes of
corporations. Connecticut levies income tax upon corporations but not
upon individuals.
13oSee Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Boys, (1921) 296 IIl. 166,
129 N. E. 724, and cases cited. Cf. Bankers' Life Co. v. Richardson, (1923)
192 Cal. 113, 218 Pac. 586, where it is said: "The so-called retaliatory laws
are also reciprocal in nature." See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
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fact that the ultimate purposes of legislation of both types are the
same, namely, to secure equality of treatment of residents and cor-
porations of the different states and to bring about the solution of
some of the problems common to two or more states.131 While
the objects are the same, the methods of attaining them are funda-
mentally different. By reciprocal legislation, the states seek to ar-
range for an interchange of favors; by retaliatory legislation, a
state threatens to return disfavors for disfavors, or evil for evil.
The courts have set up another distinction between these two types
of legislation by holding that reciprocal legislation should be freely
construed, while retaliatory legislation should be strictly con-
strued . 2 It should be assumed that a state, by enacting reciprocal
legislation, has declared that it is its policy to extend favors when-
ever possible, and any doubtful cases should be resolved so as to
extend such favors; while retaliatory legislation should not be al-
lowed to create a disability unless the case clearly comes within
its terms.
Examples of retaliatory legislation already have been referred
to in connection with the licensing of trades and professions, and
inheritance taxation. Maryland has a retaliatory law to prevent the
appointment of a nonresident as executor or guardian, if the state
in which he is resident prevents the appointment of Maryland
residents to similar offices.' 33 Vermont provides that nonresidents
shall pay the same fees for hunting and fishing licenses as would
be required of Vermont residents in the other states." 4 The most
notable use of retaliatory legislation is, however, in connection with
the taxation of foreign corporations, especially foreign insurance
companies. It appears that formerly a considerable number of
states had statutes which provided that all foreign corporations
doing business within the state, and domiciled in a state which
discriminated against corporations foreign to it, should be sub-
Commonwealth, (1908) 198 Mass. 466, 84 N. E. 863, for the observation
that "all these provisions are intended to be reciprocal." See also Lindsay,
Reciprocal Legislation, (1910) 25 Pol. Sci. Quar. 435-457.
"1'The best discussion of the distinctions between, and the common
purposes of, reciprocal and retaliatory legislation will be found in State ex
rel. v. Insurance Co., (1892) 49 Ohio St. 440, 31 N. E. 658.
"32See the decisions cited, notes 130 and 131; State v. Continental
Insurance Co., (1917) 67 Ind. App. 536, 116 N. E. 929; Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. State, (1931) 161 Wash. 135, 296 Pac. 813.
13Maryland, Code Supp. (Bagby) 1929, art. 93, secs. 41A, 210A, and
Code Supp. (Flack) 1935, art. 16, sec. 117A.
"W4Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, sec. 5615.
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jected to all the disabilities imposed by the domiciliary state.135
Retaliatory statutes of this kind, applying to all kinds of foreign
corporations, are now uncommon, the only examples being those
of New Jersey and Delaware.'36 But a number of states have re-
taliatory laws applying to foreign building and loan associations,"'
or savings and loan associations ;138 and a majority of the states
have such laws applying to foreign insurance companies.'3 5
The retaliatory statutes ordinarily provide that any taxes, fees,
penalties, or other obligations imposed by another state shall be
duplicated in the enacting state, but it is unusual to find them
brought into operation with respect to any matter other than taxa-
tion or other money payment.1 40 Most of the litigation has arisen
in connection with the retaliatory insurance laws. While there is
authority to the contrary in one state, 141 retaliatory insurance laws
have generally been held to be constitutional. 142 Although the rul-
135See Beale, The Law of Foreign Corporations, secs. 472, 597; Frost,
A Treatise on the Incorporation and Organization of Corporations, 4th ed.,
p. 199; Judson, The Extent and Evils of Double Taxation in the United
States, (1915) 58 Annals of the Amer. Acad. 105-111, p. 109; Fairchild,
The Principle of Equity in the Taxation of Foreign Corporations, (1918) 3
Bul. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 189-193, 233-237.
13'3New Jersey, Comp. Laws Supp. 1924, sec. 47-101; Delaware, Code
1915, sec. 110-73, as amended, Laws 1929, ch. 6. Nevada formerly had a
similar provision (Rev. Laws 1912, sec. 1207), but it was repealed. Laws
1919, ch. 13, sec. 2. The New Jersey law was held not contrary to its
constitution, Texas Co. v. Dickinson, (N.J. 1910) 75 Atl. 803.
137Alabama, Code 1928, sec. 7111; Georgia, Code 1933, sec. 16-209;
Iowa, Code 1935, sec. 9386; Montana, Rev. Code 1935, sec. 6355-34; New
Mexico, Comp. Stat., 1929, sec. 18-119; South Dakota, Comp. Laws 1929,
sec. 9065-Z22; Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, sec. 6910; Wisconsin, Stat. 1935,
sec. 215.42.
13Washington, Laws 1933, ch. 183, sec. 88.
10n a list compiled for the use of insurance companies, seven states
are classed as having neither a reciprocal nor a retaliatory provision,
twenty-seven as reciprocal, and fourteen as retaliatory. See (1934) Insur-
ance Year Book (Life Insurance), 451-559, passim. Although purporting to
be compiled from information furnished by insurance commissioners, this
list is inaccurate, due to a failure to distinguish between these two types
of legislation. A list which is probably accurate in almost every respect
may be consulted in Tax Systems of the World, 6th Ed., pp. 188-189. In
this list the classification is as follows: ten states, no provision; three states,
both reciprocal and retaliatory; three states, reciprocal; thirty-two states,
retaliatory; one state, not classified.
14The question of what lines of business a foreign insurance company
might conduct under a retaliatory provision was considered in State ex rel.
v. Insurance Co., (1892) 49 Ohio St. 440, 31 N. E. 658.
141Clark v. Port of Mobile, (1880) 67 Ala. 217; State v. Firemen s
Fund Ins. Co., (1931) 223 Ala. 134, 134 So. 858.
'4-Most of the opinions approving retaliatory insurance laws are
summarized and cited in Lindsay, Reciprocal Legislation, (1910) 25 Pol.
Sci. Quar. 435-457, at p. 452, and Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner
in the United States, 106-108.
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ing in Hawver Fire Insurance Company v. Harding,14 3 that a
foreign insurance company is entitled to the equal protection of
the laws, might seem to destroy the former nearly unanimous ju-
dicial opinion that retaliatory insurance laws are constitutional,'44
such interpretation probably is not justified. 14 5 A retaliatory in-
surance law does not authorize the insurance commissioner, or
other officer, to collect taxes at the combined rates of the two states,
but only at the greater rate .14 The administration of a retaliatory
insurance law is a ministerial function; the decision of an in-
surance commissioner in applying such a law is not judicial and
final, but may be reviewed by the courts. 147 A retaliatory insurance
law is a sleeping provision; it comes automatically into effect when
the legislature of another state imposes a rate of taxation higher
than that levied by the state having the retaliatory provision.'418 It
it not necessary that a company of the state having the retaliatory
provision be engaged in business in the other state, so as to suffer
from the higher tax rate. 49 Retaliatory legislation has not brought
143(1926) 272 U. S. 494, 71 L. Ed. 372, 47 Sup. Ct. 179.
1441n the Hanover Fire Insurance Company case, the Illinois law
requiring foreign insurance companies to pay higher taxes than domestic
was held to be a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Thus, a foreign
insurance company once admitted to do business must be taxed at the same
rate as domestic companies; but a tax imposed under a retaliatory provision
will always be higher than the domestic rate, so it might very well be
supposed that retaliatory provisions are a denial of the equal protection of
the laws. The case was so interpreted in State v. Firemen's Fund Insur-
ance Co., (1931) 223 Ala. 134, 134 So. 858. See also National Savings
and Loan Ass'n v. Gilles, (D.C. Idaho, 1929) 35 Fed. 2s, 386, quoting
with approval the Hanover Fire Insurance Company case to invalidate
the unequal taxation of domestic and foreign building and loan associations.
145The Hanover Fire Insurance Company case did not involve a re-
taliatory law. Moreover, that case has not been interpreted to prevent all
forms of differential taxation of foreign corporations, and foreign and
domestic corporations are taxed on different bases by many states. See
State and Local Taxation of Business Corporations (Pub. by the'National
Industrial Conference Board, New York, 1931) 61-63, 70-71. See also
Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, (1929) 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 879-895,
which leaves the impression that the interpretation of the equal protection
of the laws clause as applied to corporations cannot be regarded as settled.
246Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, (1908) 198
Mass. 466, 84 N. E. 863; State v. Reinmund, (1887) 45 Ohio St. 214, 13 N.
E. 30.
'
47State ex rel. Attorney General v. Fidelity and Casualty Insurance
Co., (1888) 39 Minn. 538, 41 N. W. 108.
248Germania Ins. Co. v. Swigert, (1889) 128 Ill. 237, 21 N. E. 530.
14Germania Ins. Co. v. Swigert, (1889) 128 Ill. 237, 21 N. E. 530;
State ex rel. Phillips v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., (1889) 77 Iowa 548, 42
N. W. 509; State v. Reinmund, (1887) 450 Ohio St. 214, 13 N. E. 30.
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about uniformity in the laws applying to foreign corporations,
especially foreign insurance companies. 110
1(JOn the absence of uniformity in the laws relating to foreign corpora-
tions, see Haring, Corporations Doing Business in Other States, 13-15. As
to insurance law, see the remarks of Edmonds, (1925) 18 Proc. Nat'l Tax
Ass'n 248; Rhodes, Life Insurance Protection and Savings as Affected by
Special Insurance Taxes, (1924) 113 Economic World 669; United States
Chamber of Commerce, (1926) Insurance Bulletin, Nos. 12, 15, 26.
